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www.fulbright.comApril2011CetelemSAv.RoustHoldingsLtdEDOCorporationv.UltraElectronicsLimitedGuangzhouDockyardsCo.Ltdv.E.N.E.AegialiIStellarShippingCoLLCv.HudsonShippingLines23EnglishHighCourtHoldsthatItHasNoJurisdictiontoHearanAppealonQuestionsofFactEndorsementofaContractResultedinaGuarantorBeingBoundbythePartiesArbitrationAgreementonlyhadpowertoorderpre-actiondisclosurewherethepartyseekingdisclosurewouldlikelybeapartytosubsequentproceedingsinthatcourt.CouslonJfurtheridentifiedanumberofsubsidiaryconsiderationseachofwhichsupportedhisconclusionregardingthemeaningofsection332.Thesewerei.thelimitednatureofthecourtspowerstointerveneandorcontroltheprocessofarbitrationwhichwaswellrecognisedtobeentirelyseparatefromlitigationbeforethecourts20051WLR3555ii.thatitwouldbecontrarytopublicpolicyforpowersundertheCivilProcedureRulestobeusedforapurposewhichwasancillarytoarbitrationandiii.theexistenceofaprioralbeitnon-bindingfirst-instancecaseinwhichpreciselythesameconclusionhadbeenreached2009EWHC682Ch.CoulsonJfurtherheldthatthecourthadnopowertoorderpre-actiondisclosureundersection443oftheArbitrationActandconrmedthatthisprovisioncanonlyberelieduponinveryexceptionalcircumstancesnoneofwhichwerepresentinthiscase.Asidefromtherelativelynarrowproceduralissuedeterminedinthiscasethecaseisinterestingbecauseitisclearfromthejudgmentthatthecourtconsideredpre-actiondisclosuretobestronglydesirablegiventhenatureofthepartiesdispute.AsaresultCouslonJwouldlikelyhaveorderedpre-actiondisclosureifhehadfoundthattherewasjurisdictiontodoso.ThatheresistedmakingsuchanorderarguablyevidencestherespectshownbytheEnglishcourtforthenarrowboundariesofitsjurisdictiontointerveneinthearbitralprocess.In2010EWHC2826CommBlairJallowedanapplicationtostrikeoutpartsofaclaimantsappealagainstanarbitrationawardwhichconcernedquestionsoffact.TheclaimanthadarguedthatitwasentitledtoappealthesequestionstotheHighCourtundersection69oftheArbitrationActwhichallowsapartyincertaincircumstancestoappealtothecourtonaquestionoflawarisingoutofanarbitralawardbecausethepartieshadagreedthatquestionsoffactcouldsobeappealed.ThisargumentwasbaseduponthefollowingwordinginthepartiesarbitrationagreementThePartiesagreethateitherPartymayappealtotheEnglishHighCourtonanyissuearisingoutoftheaward.Theclaimantassertedthatthiswasanagreementbythepartiesthatquestionsoffactcouldbeappealed.Theclaimantfurtherarguedthatthecourtsjurisdictiontohearsuchanappealwasbaseduponsection69oftheArbitrationActwhichalthoughconcerningonlyissuesoflawcouldbeexpandedbyagreementtoincludeissuesoffact.Inthisrespecttheclaimantrelieduponthewordsunlessotherwiseagreedbythepartieswhicharefoundatthebeginningofsection69oftheArbitrationActandwhichareusuallyrelieduponbypartiesthathaveagreedtodisapplytheirrightsofappealonapointoflaw.BlairJrejectedtheclaimantsargumentasamatterofcontractualconstructionfindingthatonproperconstructionofthearbitrationagreementthepartieshadnotintendedtoagreetoanappealofanyissuearisingoutoftheaward.Hefurtherrejectedtheclaimantsargumentsregardingtheextensionofsection69oftheArbitrationActconcludingthatitwasverydoubtfulwhetherthecourtwouldhavejurisdictiontoentertainanappealonquestionsoffactevenifthepartieshadagreedtoit.In2010EWHC2985CommtheHighCourtdismissedachallengetoanarbitrationawardbroughtundersection67oftheArbitrationAct.Thebasisforthischallengewasthatthetribunallackedsubstantivejurisdictionbecauseanyagreementwhichmayhaveexistedbetweenthepartiesdidnotincludeanarbitrationagreement.